The North-South Differences in Rural Underground Christianity
A Translation from Mandarin
Liu Qingfeng is a businessman from Liaoning, a northeastern Chinese province bordering North Korea and the Yellow Sea. Liu spent a decade in Shanghai and four years in Shenzhen, before moving to Beijing three years ago. He said that while businesspeople he dealt with from both China’s North and South are pragmatic and fast learners, those in the South are more “collegiate”. This attitude lends itself better to growing a private business, he thought.
“This means small and medium-sized family businesses in the south can expand to a bigger scale. The North cannot compete with that. If you read the story of successful entrepreneurs in the North, many of them are lonely heroes, fighting on their own,” Liu said.
China's North-South economic divide is growing, away from the glare of the US trade war
This news piece was perused to write a larger piece explaining and rigorously showing the following line of thought:
Early modern to contemporary Chinese salvationist religions (救度宗教; jiùdù zōngjiào)—what Overmyer calls sectarian religion—emerged as crisis responses to deficits in Chinese institutions. These crisis responses naturally expressed themselves differently in North and South:
Northern sectarian religion emerged out of the land’s ritual autarky, decentralized rituals and liturgies, and cage-of-norms societal organization. These transcended geographical divides to unify Northerners in times of crisis.
Southern sectarian religion emerged from the context of corporate clan lineages, delegated Monopoly of Legitimate Benevolence, and overall clannishness in Southern society. These encouraged ethical ideas along Confucian lines, as well as a civic mindedness that transcended clannishness. This ethical and civic encouragement did not preclude violence, which took a totalizing character in contrast to the North’s violence-as-negotiation.
The KMT and the CPC were examples of Southern expressions of sectarian religion as crisis responses.
When the CPC was pushed out of the South, the Northerners easily viewed them as the greatest sectarian religion surpassing even the boxers.
Christianity’s spread in Northern China and lack of popularity in the South thus must be viewed as a natural follow-up to these historical facts and conclusions. Christianity’s spread in the North is a crisis response to a growing institutional vacuum in a pattern that has repeated since the Southern Song. Southern religion, both non-sectarian and sectarian, fulfills any niche that Christianity could serve—though in a long line from Taiping and Hong Xiuquan, many Hakka subscribe to Christianity.

China’s rural underground Christianity includes both house churches and cult organizations. House churches are Christian organizations outside the “Three-Self” church (which refers to churches in China that are self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating, under the political leadership of the Chinese government and not subject to management or interference from foreign churches—note from Guancha.cn). Though still technically “underground,” house churches now operate publicly and have complex, ambiguous relationships with the Three-Self church. Christian cults include both homegrown and imported groups, with the former being more prevalent. Cult organizations are extreme offshoots that have split from house churches, and the two are closely connected. House churches are the incubators of cult organizations. As long as house churches exist, cults will continuously be created and derived from them, becoming ever more extreme and resulting in serious political and social consequences.
The development of underground Christianity in rural China is not uniform; there are significant differences between the north and the south. Addressing rural underground Christianity requires a regional perspective.
[Photo inset: Map of Religious Organizations by County in China]
Christianity’s Growth in the North Outpaces the South
Regional Differences in the Development of Rural Underground Christianity
Among the five major religions officially recognized by the Chinese government, Christianity stands out in terms of both the number of believers and its growth rate and trend. Although Buddhist and Taoist beliefs have seen a revival compared to pre-reform times, they are generally in decline, with few truly devout rural followers. Catholicism spreads steadily in rural areas, with underground Catholic forces being stronger in places like Hebei and Wenzhou. Traditional folk religions appear to be “reviving” in small ways, but cannot be systematically reconstructed and are rapidly declining overall. According to incomplete statistics, Christians account for more than 95% of the rural religious population, with underground Christianity making up about 70% of rural Christians. The growth of believers in the Three-Self church is relatively conservative and slow.
Regionally, the religious ecology of northern and southern rural areas differs significantly. Northern rural areas are hotspots for house churches. Although the north has a wide variety of traditional faiths, they fail to form coherent systems or self-justifying explanations; what remains is formalized and de-sacralized, unable to meet the vast religious needs of rural society. Christianity has become the orthodox faith in northern rural areas, with other faiths increasingly dismissed as “heresy” or “feudal superstition,” losing trust and acceptance among the populace. Christianity flourishes in many forms in the north, spreading rapidly, with believers making up 10–15% of the population and rising quickly—mainly within house churches. Cult organizations have been “stigmatized” in the north; local farmers can clearly distinguish between Christianity and cults, and are wary of the latter. Still, cults, with their unique methods, can attract believers, making northern rural areas dense with cult organizations whose followers tend to be secretive and extreme.
In southern rural areas, the system of ancestor worship remains largely intact, able to provide a relatively complete explanation for changing circumstances. This traditional faith system serves as an “antibody” against underground Christianity, preventing its spread. As a result, there is little Christian presence in most southern rural areas (except for a few counties/cities), and most believers are found in cities. With Christianity spreading little, most people lack relevant concepts and knowledge; they neither oppose nor follow it, so they cannot distinguish Christianity from cults. This in turn enables cults to spread. Surveys show sporadic cult activity in Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and elsewhere, leading to fierce conflicts with local farmers. These surveys also show that southern belief systems are breaking down, and people are abandoning the antibodies that once resisted underground Christianity.
Why Does Underground Christianity Flourish in the Rural North?
To answer this question is to understand what kind of faith rural Chinese need, and how to meet those needs.
Christianity’s popularity in the north is first related to the region’s faith base. When rural residents choose a faith, it is not out of identification with doctrine or to answer spiritual questions, but to meet daily needs and make up for deficiencies in life, production, or social interaction. In other words, faith is functional—chosen for practical needs.
Northern functional faiths have several features:
Plurality of deities—polytheism. Some deities fulfill specific needs; some are more “powerful” than others.
Choice and interchangeability—farmers worship gods that work for them, and abandon those that don’t; loyalty is temporary and pragmatic.
No dominant deity—all gods are considered equal and interchangeable.
Christianity is a Western faith, and farmers call Jesus “the Lord.” To the rural mind, the Western world is more advanced, so their god must be more powerful. When other gods fail, and after hearing preachers say Jesus is stronger, they turn to Christianity as a last resort. Surveys show that most first-generation house church members converted only after traditional deities proved ineffective.
Surveys also show that most who join house churches never leave and become more devout, bringing their families along. Fewer than 5% actually quit. Why? If the local faith is so pragmatic and fluid, why do people stay once they join Christianity?
Several reasons:
House churches claim that leaving Christianity brings divine punishment.
Christianity denounces all other deities as devils.
Traditional belief systems in the north are fragmented and can’t offer comprehensive explanations, while Christianity offers a strong self-explanatory system.
These factors make people afraid or unwilling to leave.
More importantly, Christianity is an aggressive, missionary faith—each believer is obliged to evangelize, especially in house churches, whose desire to spread the faith is far stronger than in the more regulated Three-Self churches. No other rural faith system matches this.
Because evangelizers are local farmers, they can tailor their message to specific needs and confusions. House churches can promptly address real social and spiritual needs, alleviate anxiety and insecurity—particularly during periods of rapid social change, with increasingly unstable social structures, and more intense social competition. Many farmers, especially those left behind in social competition, experience anxiety, insecurity, and a loss of meaning. This can manifest in frequent and fierce disputes (mother-in-law vs. daughter-in-law, marital, neighborly, family disputes), which have intensified in recent decades of rural transformation.
When house church members come to minister—often neighbors or relatives—they offer psychological comfort, spiritual explanations, and practical advice (for example, telling a daughter-in-law to use Jesus’s love to forgive a difficult mother-in-law, or vice versa). This directly addresses the psychological and social needs of farmers, helping them find peace and satisfaction. Thus, they remain in the church rather than seeking other gods.
In summary, Christianity offers a high degree of social responsiveness unmatched by other rural faiths. Through their evangelizers, house churches meet real social needs, alleviate anxiety, and help people accept the existing social order.
It also shows that when these problems arise and the government fails to respond adequately, house churches fill the gap by meeting those needs, gradually gaining ground in rural society.
[Photo inset: The Accelerating Development of Rural Christianity in Recent Years]
Christianity is growing ever faster in rural areas.
Why Is Underground Christianity Relatively Rare in the Southern Countryside?
As described above, underground Christianity and house churches are much less common in the southern countryside. After a while, Christian missionaries find that rural people simply won’t convert, so they focus instead on cities. The difference lies not in Christianity itself, but in the different bases of faith between north and south.
Both north and south are pragmatic, polytheistic, and allow choice of deities. However, in the north, there is no dominant deity; all are equal choices. In the south, traditional faith is led by ancestor worship, with other deities playing only supplemental roles. Ancestors cannot be chosen or replaced; farmers believe their ancestors will protect them as long as they are respected. Ancestor worship is tied to the idea of passing on the family line—one’s primary duty is to produce descendants for the ancestors, so that one can face them after death and become an ancestor oneself.
Thus, farmers place their limited lives in the infinite process of passing on the family line, gaining value and meaning. Only by having sons can one have hope, be fulfilled, and receive ancestral protection. Those without descendants are hopeless and adrift.
Therefore, ancestor worship and continuing the family line are the core rural “religion” in the south—deeply rooted and hard to change. Even successive political campaigns and the shocks of the market economy have not shaken it. The physical presence of ancestral halls and graves remains a testament to this faith.
Other southern deities serve as supplements to ancestor worship, meeting specific needs (health, wealth, children, safety, studies), or strengthening the ancestors’ power through rituals. The custom of “parading the gods” brings deities to ancestral halls to enhance their power.
Because southern faith has a clear hierarchy (dominant and supplemental), it preserves a system capable of offering comprehensive explanations for new social phenomena. Underground Christianity is hated here because it rejects ancestor worship, calling ancestors “devils,” which is intolerable. Even if Jesus is said to be more powerful, few will abandon ancestor worship for minor gains—especially since it already provides a complete system of explanations. Thus, Christianity cannot undermine ancestor worship, and southern farmers are confident in their faith.
In contrast, northern belief is fragmented; when Christianity arrives, it cannot defend itself, so farmers lose confidence in their traditional faith and embrace Christianity.
In summary, the relatively complete ancestor-worship-based faith system in the south is the key “antibody” against Christianity, making it hard for the latter to spread there.
Why Are Rural Cult Organizations Becoming More Extreme?
Christian cult organizations in rural China have developed from splits within house churches. House churches are both illegal and internally fragmented, rife with factions and conflict. In the 1980s–90s, they lacked unified pastors or training; the first generation of preachers were mostly poorly educated farmers, leading to major doctrinal misunderstandings and “heresies.”
After the first generation of “heretical” leaders left, the second generation, seeking followers and organizational strength, resorted to all possible means—organizational, doctrinal, and otherwise—growing ever more extreme and eventually becoming full-blown cults. Well-known groups like “Three Redeemers,” “Zhengdao,” and “Eastern Lightning” all originated from house churches.
As house churches grew in the north, internal opposition to cults intensified and awareness increased. As house churches became widespread, ordinary farmers learned to distinguish Christianity from cults, avoiding the latter. This has shrunk the space for cults in the north, making recruitment harder. Yet internal division persists, continually generating new “heretical” groups.
This creates a contradiction: cults are being squeezed yet multiplying in number, so they must become more extreme to survive and attract followers. Tactics include using kinship and friendship networks, coercion, and even restriction of personal freedom. Many families with cult members see entire extended families converted. Cults have no exit mechanism; leaving often costs dearly—even life itself. Some have crossed the line into criminal gang activity. Doctrinally, some declare all non-believers to be “devils” that must be eliminated; some promise vast wealth and women to believers; some predict apocalypse and use fear to coerce converts.
Only by becoming “more extreme” can cults expand. The May 28, 2014 Zhaoyuan murder case showed that cults remain public and have reached new extremes, the inevitable product of northern house church proliferation. As long as house churches continue to grow, new heresies and more extreme cults will be continually generated, bringing serious political and social consequences.
Governance Requires Regional Differentiation
In summary, the development of underground Christianity in rural China is uneven, mainly in north-south differences:
In the north, the lack of a dominant deity and fragmented traditional faiths leave people open to Christianity, which meets social and spiritual needs in a timely, proactive way—so few ever leave once they join.
In the south, the dominant ancestor-worship system remains intact, providing an “antibody” against underground Christianity.
Rapid development of house churches in the north has created many cults and made them more extreme. Southern farmers cannot distinguish Christianity from cults, creating space for cults to develop. Northern cults are more active and extreme.
With a clear understanding of these differences, targeted governance measures can be taken to curb underground Christianity’s spread:
In southern rural areas, stop building new churches. Since there are few churches, even in county seats, government-built churches can mislead farmers into thinking Christianity is officially encouraged.
In the south, encourage rebuilding ancestral halls, making them centers for elders’ activities and reviving traditional village rituals.
In the north, stop building new churches, demolish illegal religious venues, bring house churches under Three-Self management, and confiscate non-compliant property and clergy.
In the north, encourage traditional faiths, and crack down on house churches’ denigration of tradition.
In both north and south, crack down on cults, using new legal tools beyond existing public security and criminal laws, which are currently insufficient.